We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary household consumption behavior that is not cooperative (or Pareto e¢ cient). We derive global and necessary and su¢ cient conditions for data consistency with the model. Interestingly, contrary to existing results for the di¤erential approach, these revealed preference conditions for the noncooperative model are independent from (or non-nested with) the conditions for the cooperative model. We show that the conditions can be veri…ed by means of relatively straightforward mixed integer programming (MIP) methods, which is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis. Our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods. An application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the empirical relevance of the noncooperative consumption model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst empirical application of the noncooperative consumption model. JEL Classi…cation: D11, D12, D13, C14.
Introduction
We present a nonparametric revealed preference characterization of the non-unitary household consumption model that is identi…ed by noncooperative behavior. This characterization allows us to develop a practical method for analyzing noncooperative household consumption. In addition, it enables us to derive some interesting theoretical results, such as independence (or non-nestedness) between the cooperative model and the noncooperative model of household consumption. We use our method to analyze household consumption data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst empirical application of the noncooperative household consumption model. This introductory section motivates our main research questions, and relates them to the existing literature.
Non-unitary household consumption. There is a growing consensus that multi-person household consumption behavior should no longer be treated as if it the household were a single decision maker that optimizes a household utility function subject to the household budget constraint. Indeed, this so-called unitary model of household consumption imposes empirically testable restrictions on the household demand function (e.g. Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected when confronted with consumption or labor supply data of multi-person households. See, for example, Lundberg (1988) , Thomas (1990) , Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) , Du ‡o (2003) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008) .
Because of these empirical problems of the unitary model, an emerging literature explicitly acknowledges that households are composed of distinct individuals who are endowed with their own preferences, and that household consumption decisions are determined by an underlying intrahousehold decision mechanism. 1 We refer to this approach as the non-unitary approach to household consumption. Typically, nonunitary consumption models allow for privately consumed goods as well as publicly consumed goods within the household. In addition, following Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , the usual assumption is that household allocations are Pareto e¢ cient; in the household consumption literature, Pareto e¢ ciency corresponds to the so-called cooperative within-household solution of the intrahousehold allocation problem. 2 However, the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption has been questioned for the publicly consumed goods. Most notably, it has been argued that the informational requirement and the resulting cost of implementing cooperation may often be unrealistic. See, for example, Preston (2005, 2010) and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010) . In this paper we develop a methodology that allows for analyzing noncooperative household consumption behavior. Speci…cally, we will model noncooperative behavior as corresponding to a Nash equilibrium allocation within the household. It will be interesting to compare our characterization of this noncooperative within-household allocation with the one of the cooperative (or Pareto e¢ cient) allocation. At this point, noting that we see at least two reasons why it is important to know whether or not household consumption behavior is cooperative. First, from a welfarist perspective, it gives an idea of the welfare improvement that is possible within a certain household. If it is possible to link intrahousehold (non)cooperation to household characteristics, it may be possible to use this knowledge for welfare enhancement measures that correct the e¢ ciency loss originating from household behavior that is noncooperative. Second, the issue has also important implications for the structure of optimal taxation and policies that target to alter the intrahousehold income distribution. See, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for a discussion on such targeting issues in a non-unitary setting. In this respect, di¤erent (cooperative or noncooperative) consumption models may lead to other intrahousehold allocations.
Cooperative and noncooperative household consumption models: literature review. By now, the modeling of the cooperative case is quite complete. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide a di¤erential characterization of the cooperative model. 3 The speci…c feature of this di¤erential approach is that it focuses on properties of functions (e.g. cost, indirect utility and demand functions). In this respect, it is well-known that the unitary condition of Slutsky symmetry no longer holds as a (necessary and su¢ cient) condition for consistency with the non-unitary cooperative model. Browning and Chiappori have shown that a necessary condition for the cooperative model is that the (pseudo) Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric negative semide…nite matrix and a deviation matrix of rank smaller than 1 (in the case of two household members). As shown by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) , this condition, together with homogeneity and adding up, is also locally su¢ cient for consistency with the cooperative model. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2010a ,b) complement these di¤erential results by presenting a revealed preference characterization of the same cooperative model. In the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) , 4 this revealed preference characterization does not pertain to properties of functions representing household consumption behavior (e.g. cost, indirect utility or demand functions). It implies a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a …nite set of household consumption data to be consistent with the model. For the publicly consumed quantities, this condition requires the existence of suitable Lindahl prices such that each individual in the household satis…es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp; see Section 2.1) when using these individual Lindahl prices to evaluate the public goods. In contrast to the cooperative model, the noncooperative model assumes that each individual within the household maximizes her/his own utility given the consumption of the other household members. In this case, the household consumption decision is determined by the Nash equilibrium solution. See, among others, Ulph (1988) , Lundberg and Pollak (1993) , Chen and Wolley (2001) , Preston (2005, 2010 ) and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010). Lechene and Preston (2010) derived a di¤erential characterization of the model with voluntary contributions for the publicly consumed goods. They …nd that a testable implication of this noncooperative model is that the (pseudo) Slutsky matrix must be the sum of a symmetric negative semide…nite matrix and a deviation matrix with rank smaller than (K + 1) where K is the number of public goods (again in the case of two household members). Three remarks are important in view of our following exposition. First, at present it is not known whether this necessary condition is also (locally) su¢ cient. Second, this noncooperative condition is nested with the (di¤erential) cooperative condition mentioned above: data consistency with the cooperative condition always implies data consistency with the noncooperative condition, but not vice versa. Finally, a complementary revealed preference characterization of the noncooperative household consumption model is nonexistent in the literature. 5 This study. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the revealed preference characterization of noncooperative household consumption behavior. The revealed preference approach has a number of attractive features. First of all, our characterization is global, while a di¤erential characterization is typically local in nature.-We get a global condition that enables checking consistency of a given data set with a particular consumption model; in the spirit of Varian (1982) , we refer to this as 'testing'data consistency with the model under study. 6 Second, we are able to verify this condition while keeping its inherent nonparametric nature, i.e. the associated tests do not require an a priori (typically non-veri…able) parametric speci…cation of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individual preferences). By contrast, the di¤erential approach (until present) usually maintains additional assumptions concerning the functional form for the demand function (and thus individual preferences) when verifying the abovementioned rank conditions of the (pseudo) Slutsky matrix (e.g. Browning and Chiappori (1998) start from a quadratic almost ideal demand system in their empirical analysis). More speci…cally, we show that our nonparametric tests imply a relatively straightforward mixed integer programming (MIP) problem, which combines linear constraints with binary integer variables. This MIP formulation is particularly attractive from a practical point of view: for a given data set, it allows for testing data consistency with a speci…c consumption model by applying standard MIP solution techniques. Two further features imply notable di¤erences with the di¤erential results described above. First, the testable revealed preference condition is not only necessary but also su¢ cient for data consistency with the noncooperative consumption model. Second, we will show that the condition for the noncooperative model is not nested with the condition for the cooperative model: data consistency with the (global) condition for full cooperation is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for data consistency with the (global) condition for noncooperation. This makes it interesting to compare the empirical validity of di¤erent models. In fact, we can meaningfully verify data consistency with a given model (and compare di¤erent models) even if there are only a few observations and without restriction on the number of privately consumed goods (see Section 3.2 and Section 4).
We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our approach through an empirical application to data taken from the RLMS. As indicated above, as far as we know, this is the …rst application of the noncooperative household consumption model to a real-life data set. Interestingly, this application demonstrates the empirical relevance of our theoretical insights on independence (or non-nestedness) of, on the one hand, the revealed preference condition for the cooperative model and, on the other hand, the revealed preference condition for the noncooperative model. In addition, for the data under study we obtain that the cooperative model and the noncooperative model have about the same power in terms of detecting random behavior. As such, our application motivates considering the noncooperative model in addition to the (more common) cooperative model in empirical analysis of household consumption behavior.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 considers the rational individual model and brie ‡y recaptures the revealed preference characterization of the cooperative model. Subsequently, Section 3 provides the char-acterization of the noncooperative model and shows the independence result. Section 4 introduces the MIP approach for empirical veri…cation of the noncooperative condition, and presents our empirical application. Section 5 summarizes and formulates a number of concluding remarks.
Setting the stage
In this section, we introduce our notation and a number of preliminary concepts that will be instrumental for our following exposition. First, we consider the revealed preference characterization of the rational individual model. Next, we introduce the household consumption problem in a non-unitary framework. Subsequently, we consider the cooperative solution to this problem. This cooperative model will serve as a useful benchmark for the noncooperative model that we discuss in the next section.
The rational individual
Consider an individual with a utility function U . Throughout, we will assume that utility functions U are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in their arguments. Let T = f1; : : : ; jT jg be a set of observations. Given a (strictly positive) price vector p t and income Y t (t 2 T ), we assume that the rational individual chooses the consumption bundle q in her/his budget set that maximizes her/his utility. In particular, the rational individual solves the following optimization problem (OP-I): 7 q t 2 arg max q U (q) s:t: hp t ; qi Y t A data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T consists of a collection of observed strictly positive price vectors p t and a collection of observed positive demand vectors q t . In this paper, we distinguish between the concepts of consistency, which is a property of an individual observation fp t ; q t g, and the notion of rationalizability, which is a property of the entire data set, fp t ; q t g t2T . We use the following de…nition of individual-consistency.
De…nition 1 (individual-consistency) An observation fp t ; q t g is individual-consistent for utility function U , if q t solves OP-I given the function U and income Y t = hp t ; q t i.
If an observation fp t ; q t g is not individual-consistent for U , then U cannot be the true underlying utility function. The concept of individual-rationalizability requires that there exists at least one (common) utility function for which every observation t 2 T is individual-consistent.
De…nition 2 (individual-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The set S is individual-rationalizable if there exist a utility function U such that, for all t 2 T , the observation fp t ; q t g is individual-consistent for the utility function U . Varian (1982) established that the set S is individual-rationalizable if and only if it satis…es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp).
De…nition 3 (GARP) Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The set S satis…es garp if there exists a binary relation R such that the following holds. The following theorem is probably the single most important result in revealed preference theory (see Varian, 1982 , based on Afriat, 1967) .
Theorem 1 Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a utility function U that individual-rationalizes S.
S satis…es garp.
3. For all t 2 T , there exist a positive number U t and a strictly positive number t such that, for all t; v 2 T ,
This result has two important implications. First, data consistency with garp is necessary and su¢ cient for individual-rationalizability of the data; see condition 2. Next, condition 3 provides an equivalent characterization in terms of the socalled Afriat inequalities, which allow an explicit construction of the utility levels associated with each observation t (i.e. utility level U t for observed q t ). In our following discussion of household consumption models, we will mainly concentrate on the garp characterization of rational individual behavior. As we will show, this focus on garp enables us to formulate testable implications of consumption models in mixed integer programming (MIP) terms (see Section 4). However, in principle our garp-based characterization of consumption models can equivalently be expressed in terms of Afriat inequalities (by building on Theorem 1; see also the proof of Theorem 3).
Non-unitary household consumption
To keep our exposition simple, we focus on 2-person (A and B) households in what follows. However, extensions to households with more than 2 members are fairly straightforward. Individuals have to decide over the consumption of a bundle of jJj private goods (J = f1; : : : ; jJjg) and a bundle of jKj public goods (K = f1; : : : ; jKjg).
As indicated above, the non-unitary approach to household consumption explicitly recognizes that di¤erent household members have own (rational) preferences, which are represented by individual utility functions. In what follows, because we account for private and public consumption in the household, the utility of the individuals A and B is given by the functions U A (q A ; Q) and U B (q B ; Q), with q A and q B the private consumption bundles of A and B, and Q the public consumption bundle. 8 In our non-unitary framework, the empirical analysis of household consumption starts from a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . For every observation t 2 T , the vectors
+ represent the household bundles of public and private goods demanded at t; and we write q t;j , and Q t;k for the demanded quantity of private good j or public good k at t (j 2 J, k 2 K). Thus, using p t 2 R jJj ++ for the (strictly positive) price vector of the private goods, P t 2 R jKj ++ for the (strictly positive) price vector of the public goods and Y t ( hp t ; q t i + hP t ; Q t i) for household income, the household faces the following budget constraint at t:
We take the …rst private good as the numeraire. As such, we may normalize the prices in any data set S such that p t;1 = 1 for all t 2 T . To facilitate our exposition, we will maintain two additional assumptions in this and the next section. First, we will assume that the empirical analyst only observes the aggregate private demands q t , and not the individual bundles q A t and q B t . However, it is easy to extend our analysis and results to include information on q A t and q B t , i.e. the private consumption of the individuals A and B is (partly) observed. See our empirical application in Section 4 for a speci…c example. Next, we will assume that all components of the aggregate demands Q t are strictly positive and that the numeraire is desirable, i.e. q A t;1 and q B t;1 are always assumed to be strict positive. Again, we could easily relax this assumption by introducing some additional notation, but this would only complicate the discussion while not really adding any new insights. In fact, our empirical application in Section 4 will consider data sets with some components of Q t equal to zero; our basic theoretical insights developed below apply with equal strength to this setting.
The cooperative benchmark
Let us then consider the revealed preference characterization of the cooperative model. We recall that this model assumes that for each t 2 T the household consumption decision coincides with a Pareto optimal allocation. Thus, we can de…ne the following concept of cooperative-consistency.
De…nition 4 (cooperative-consistency) An observation fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g is cooperativeconsistent for utility functions U A and U B if there exist bundles q that sum to q t such that, for all bundles q A ; q
The interpretation of cooperative-consistency is analogous to the one of individualconsistency. Speci…cally, assume that an observation fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g, t 2 T , is not cooperative-consistent for U A and U B . Then, any household whose members hold these utility functions cannot have chosen fq t ; Q t g if the household decision outcome is to be Pareto e¢ cient. Next, we can de…ne the following concept of cooperative-rationalizability.
De…nition 5 (cooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The set S is cooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility functions U A and U B such that, for all t 2 T , fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g is cooperative-consistent for the utility
The intuition is readily similar to before: if a data set S is not cooperativerationalizable then it cannot have been generated by a household choosing Paretoe¢ cient allocations.
The next result gives the revealed preference condition associated with cooperativerationalizability (see also Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen 2007, 2010b).
Theorem 2 Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The data set S is cooperative-rationalizable. 10 In what follows, we will see that this identi…ability result does not hold in general for consumption models that are noncooperative. 9 If U M is not di¤erentiable, we may take the suitable subdi¤erentials that satisfy the …rst order conditions. 10 Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) provide related identi…ability results that start from a di¤erential characterization of the cooperative model.
For all t 2 T , there exist public price vectorsP

The noncooperative model
As indicated above, the noncooperative model assumes that each observed household allocation corresponds to a Nash equilibrium solution with voluntary contributions for the publicly consumed goods. This section provides the revealed preference characterization of this noncooperative model. Speci…cally, we provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition for data consistency with the model. In addition, we show independence (or non-nestedness) between this condition and the condition for the cooperative model that we discussed above.
Revealed preference characterization
In view of our further exposition, we use the notation Q A and Q B to represent the contributions to the public goods by A and B, so that Q A +Q B = Q. The fact that we explicitly distinguish between A and B's contribution to the public consumption may seem a bit unconventional. However, this distinction will be useful to characterize the noncooperative model (e.g. Lechene and Preston, 2005 and 2010, make a similar distinction). Assume prices p t and P t for the private and public goods, and some household income Y t . Then, an allocation fq 
where we use M; L 2 fA; Bg with M 6 = L: Given this, we can de…ne when a certain observation is noncooperative-consistent The interpretation of noncooperative-consistency is readily similar to the one of individual-and cooperative-consistency. Using this concept, we can de…ne noncooperativerationalizability.
De…nition 7 (noncooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The set S is noncooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility functions U A and U B such that, for all t 2 T , fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g; is noncooperative-consistent for the utility functions U A and U B .
We then obtain the following revealed preference characterization of noncooperativerationalizability.
Theorem 3 Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The data set S is noncooperative-rationalizable.
2. For all t 2 T and k 2 K; there exist public price vectorsP represent the individuals'MWTP for the public goods (in casu at the noncooperative household equilibrium). Then, for each public good k (with Q t;k > 0), the …rst order equilibrium conditions for problem OP-N e¤ectively imply NC.2. To interpret this equality requirement as an equilibrium condition, let us consider the two possible inequality situations. First, ifP A t;k > P t;k then the MWTP of A for one additional unit of k (i.e.P A t;k ) is larger than the price A has to pay for it (i.e. P t;k ). Hence, A will increase her/his contribution to good k. A directly similar interpretation applies to the situationP B t;k > P t;k . And, thus, maxfP A t;k ;P B t;k g > P t;k implies a disequilibrium. Similarly, if maxfP A t;k ;P B t;k g < P t;k then either A or B (whoever contributes positively to good k) will want to decrease her/his contribution to k. Again, this implies a disequilibrium situation.
Next, the conditions NC.4 and NC.5 follow from the fact that, ifP A t;k < P t;k (P B t;k < P t;k ), then A (B) will sell back any positive amount of the public good k. This implies Q The second remark pertains to our earlier argument that, in principle, under cooperative-rationalizability the (unobserved) within-household income distribution (i.e. the sharing rule) can be identi…ed from the observed set S. This identi…ability result does not generally hold under noncooperative-rationalizability. Speci…cally, it directly follows from the budget constraint in OP-N that the income shares of the two individuals are given by:
Given this, conditions NC.4 and NC.5 imply that Y t;k = Q t;k ) and, thus, the expenditures on good k cannot be assigned to the individual household members. Interestingly, this result complies with the so-called local income pooling result, which also applies to situations where both individuals contribute to the same public good in a noncooperative setting; see Kemp (1984) 
B
t that are consistent with a noncooperative-rationalization of the given data set. These bounds then account for the total (non-assignable) expenditures on the jointly contributed public goods. 11 However, see Lechene and Preston (2005) for some example settings where the assumption of strictly positive Q Finally, it is worth indicating that the revealed preference characterization in Theorem 3 also provides a useful starting point for testing alternative assumptions regarding the speci…c nature of the noncooperative behavior that is under study. For example, one can investigate whether noncooperative-rationalizable behavior is consistent with the separate spheres Nash equilibrium concept discussed above. Or, if this is not the case, one can test alternative assumptions regarding the (number of) jointly contributed public goods. It follows from our above discussion that such assumptions essentially imply constraints that are linear in the public price vectors, which must then be added to the rationalizability conditions NC.1-NC.3. For example, if we assume that member A (B) contributes to good k at observation t then we imposeP A t;k = P t;k (P B t;k = P t;k ). The linear nature of these constraints is attractive in view of practical applications. Speci…cally, it makes that we can easily include them in the mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation of conditions NC.1-NC.3 that we will introduce in the Section 4.1. As we will discuss, this MIP formulation makes it possible to verify noncooperative-rationalizability in practice.
Independence
We can show that the revealed preference condition for noncooperative behavior is independent of the revealed preference condition for cooperative behavior: a data set that satis…es the cooperative condition does not necessarily satisfy the noncooperative condition, and vice versa. In particular, the two examples in Appendix 2 show that there is neither any inclusion nor any exclusion relation between the collection of data sets that satisfy the condition in Theorem 2 and the collection of data sets that satisfy the condition in Theorem 3.
This independence/non-nestedness conclusion is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, this result stands in sharp contrast with the …ndings in the di¤erential approach to modeling non-unitary consumption behavior. As discussed in the Introduction, the rationalizability condition for the noncooperative model derived in that approach are generally nested with the rationalizability condition for the cooperative model: if a given data set passes the condition for cooperative rationalizability, then it must also pass the test for noncooperative rationalizability, but not vice versa. Secondly, our empirical application in Section 4 will show that this independence is not a theoretical curiosity but also has empirical relevance. This application does e¤ectively include data that are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable, and (di¤erent) data that are noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable.
Apart from independence, the examples in Appendix 2 demonstrate two further features of our revealed preference conditions that are important in view of empirical applications. Firstly, they show that we can meaningfully test data consistency with speci…c household consumption models (and compare the empirical validity of di¤erent models) even if only a few observations are available. Secondly, because all consumption is public in both examples, such empirical analysis in principle does not require privately consumed goods. In fact, this last feature implies an additional di¤erence with the existing di¤erential characterization of the noncooperative model: this di¤erential characterization typically requires (much) more privately consumed goods than publicly consumed goods in order to obtain empirically testable restrictions; see Preston (2005, 2010) .
We see two possible explanations for these di¤erences between the di¤erential approach and the revealed preference approach that we follow here. A …rst explanation is that our revealed preference characterization is global, while the existing di¤eren-tial characterization is local in nature. Next, our condition for the noncooperative model is both necessary and su¢ cient, while the existing di¤erential condition of the model is necessary but not su¢ cient (see our discussion in the Introduction). In fact, our results suggest that there may exist a su¢ cient di¤erential condition for the noncooperative model that is not nested with the existing necessary and su¢ cient condition for the cooperative model.
Empirical application
We apply our method to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009, 2010b) studied the same data set. These authors focused on consistency of these data with the cooperative model of household consumption. We extend these earlier studies by providing complementary results pertaining to the noncooperative model. In doing so, we also generalize the MIP methodology introduced by these authors (for the cooperative case) to apply to noncooperative household behavior.
Our following analysis will concentrate on consistency testing, and will particularly illustrate the empirical relevance of the independence result articulated above (see Section 3.2). If household behavior is found consistent with a particular (cooperative or noncooperative) model, then subsequent analysis can focus on recovering/identifying the speci…cities of the decision model that underlies the (rationalizable) observed consumption behavior. For brevity, we do not consider recovery issues in this application. However, we will return to recovery (based on our MIP methodology) in the concluding section.
Veri…cation
To be able to verify the garp conditions in Theorems 2 and 3, we reformulate these conditions in mixed integer programming (MIP) terms. To obtain this MIP for-mulation, we de…ne the binary variables x M t;v 2 f0; 1g, with x
, has a straightforwardly similar meaning as q t Rq v in Section 2). Then, a data set S satis…es the necessary and su¢ cient condition for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3 if and only if the following MIP problem is feasible:
For all t; v 2 T and all k 2 K, there exist strictly positive vectorsP A t ;P B t and binary variables z t;k ; x M t;v 2 f0; 1g such that (for s; t; v 2 T , k 2 K, M = A; B):
(2)
(1
with C t > P t;k and C t > Y t for all t and k:
The interpretation is as follows. Constraint (5) imposes that the private consumption bundles q A t and q B t sum to the observed aggregate quantities q t , as required by condition NC.1. Further, constraints (2)-(4) comply with condition NC.2 in Theorem 3. The constraint (2) imposes the given upper bound restriction forP A t and P B t . Next, (3) imposes P t;k P A t;k if z t;k = 0, while (4) imposes P t;k P B t;k if z t;k = 1. Because z t;k 2 f0; 1g, this implies maxfP A t;k ;P B t;k g = P t;k and thus condition NC.2 is satis…ed. Finally, constraints (6)- (8) 
Data
We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009, 2010b) for a detailed discussion of the RLMS data that we use. These authors also provide more speci…c information on the assignability procedure that we present below. For compactness, we restrict ourselves to a brief summary here.
Our sample consists of 148 adult couples, with both (female and male) household members employed. We consider each of the 148 households separately, which avoids (often debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across male or female members of di¤erent households. This illustrates the use of our method for a panel data set. However, it is worth emphasizing that revealed preference methods such as ours are equally applicable to (repeated) cross-section data sets. In this respect, we refer to Crawford (2003, 2008) for some recent methodological advances.
Our data set covers the period from 1994 to 2003. We have consumption data for each year except for the years 1997 and 1999, so that we end up with 8 (= jT j) observations (prices and quantities) per household. We consider bundles consisting of 21 (= jJj + jKj) nondurable goods: (1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel, (4) wood fuel, (5) gas fuel, (6) luxury goods, (7) (21) tobacco. We assume that wood fuel, gas fuel and housing rent are public (jKj = 3), while the other goods are private (jJj = 18).
Our application will show the possibility of including speci…c information on q Essentially, the procedure starts from a base scenario for the distribution of the privately consumed quantities across the two household members. Because assignable quantity information is not directly available from the RLMS data set, this base scenario uses the observed consumption of male and female singles (or one-person households). 13 In subsequent steps, we consider less and less assignability, i.e. we account for (ever larger) deviations from the base scenario distribution. Formally, using q bM t for the private quantities of member M that correspond to the hypothesized 13 For example, it is observed that the average budget share of alcohol for male singles is (about) 5 times the corresponding budget share for female singles. Given this, in the base scenario the male consumes 5/6 of all alcohol bought by the household and the female consumes 1/6. See Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010b) for a more detailed discussion of the base scenario that we use here.
base scenario, we de…ne Table 1 presents pass rates for the cooperative model and the noncooperative model under di¤erent degrees of assignability (captured by ). The table reveals that pass rates increase if decreases. This is not surprising given that lower values comply with less assignable information for the privately consumed quantities. For one household, we need = 0:60 for a rationalization in terms of the cooperative model as well as the noncooperative model. If we look at the aggregate pass rates in Table 1 , we do not …nd much di¤erence between the cooperative model and the noncooperative model. To some extent, this provides empirical support for both types of non-unitary models (conditional on the base scenario that is assumed). Our data set does not allow us to empirically distinguish between the two models for most households.
Results
Still, even though the two models provide a rather good overall …t of observed household behavior, there are some notable di¤erences for speci…c households. For example, for = 0:90 the noncooperative model rationalizes the behavior of two more households than the cooperative model, while for = 0:80 we observe a better …t of the cooperative model. Table 2 provides more detailed results pertaining to individual households. It reports on (i) the number of households that are noncooperativerationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable and (ii) the number of households that are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-rationalizable. The table suggest that the adequate behavioral model varies with the household under consideration: for some households the cooperative model provides a better …t of observed behavior than the noncooperative model, while the opposite holds for other households. Generally, this motivates the empirical relevance of considering the noncooperative model of household behavior in addition to the (more common) cooperative model.
As a further base of comparison, we have also calculated power results for the di¤erent model speci…cations. For each household and each , we compute a power measure that quanti…es the probability of detecting random behavior. Random behavior is then modeled using a bootstrap method: for each observation, with given prices and income, we de…ne quantities by randomly drawing budget shares (for the 21 goods) from the set of 1184 (= 148 x 8) observed household choices. Thus, our power assessment gives information on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information on the households'actual choices. 14 Table 1 reports on the distribution of the power measure de…ned over the 148 households under study. These results are based on Monte Carlo-type simulations that include 1000 iterations. We …nd that the power varies a lot across households and models: while it is reasonably high for some households (see in particular the maximum and 3rd quartile values for higher ), it is also very low for other households (see the minimum and 1st quartile values). Generally, these results suggest that assignable quantity information can be particularly helpful to enhance the power of tests for non-unitary models (with or without cooperation). Next, we recall that our analysis uses only 8 observations per household. Obviously, power can only improve when more observations become available.
In the context of the present study, it seems particularly interesting to compare the power of the cooperative and noncooperative models. 15 For the data under consideration, we observe that the power distribution for the noncooperative model is situated somewhat below the one for the cooperative model for each value of . However, the di¤erence is very small; we can safely conclude that the power distributions are generally close to each other. In our opinion, this provides additional motivation for considering the noncooperative consumption model in addition to the cooperative model.
[ Table 1 about here]
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As a …nal exercise, we illustrate the possibility to test separate spheres and alternative assumptions regarding the number of jointly contributed public goods (in casu with joint contributions for one, two or three goods). As explained above, such assumptions imply linear restrictions that are easily included in the MIP formulation of our noncooperative rationalizability conditions. Table 3 presents our results. For the scenarios with joint contributions to less than three public goods, we also indicate the identity of the public goods (with good 1 = wood fuel, good 2 = gas fuel and good 3 = housing rent). For compactness, we only provide results for = 1:00; the pattern of results for other values of is largely similar to the one in Table 1 . A similar quali…cation holds for the power results associated with the di¤erent models, which are also not reported here. Of course, power is slightly higher under additional restrictions. 16 A …rst observation from Table 3 is that the assumptions of separate spheres and jointly contributed public goods do matter for our tests of the noncooperative model. We do …nd this noncooperative model no longer rationalizes the behavior of some households under these additional assumptions; the more restrictive models are generally associated with a lower pass rate. Also, it seems that the identity of the jointly contributed public good may play an important role. For example, in our application the pass rate decreases substantially if we assume that household members provide joint contributions to public good 3. Next, for the given data set we cannot reject that some households have joint contributions to two or three public goods. We note that this need not necessarily contradict the theoretical result of Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010), which states that (generically) the number of public goods to which both individuals contribute is at most one. Speci…cally, we have only 8 observations per household in this study. It may well be that we would empirically reject joint contributions to more than one public good for every household if we had more than 8 observations.
[ Table 3 about here]
Concluding discussion
We have presented a revealed preference methodology for analyzing noncooperative household consumption behavior. We started from a global characterization of the noncooperative consumption model, which complements the existing local di¤eren-tial characterization. Our approach allows for an empirical analysis of such behavior while avoiding (typically nonveri…able) parametric structure for the household decision process. Such analysis can make use of MIP techniques, and is thus easy-toimplement. Interestingly, our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods. Our application to RLMS data suggests the empirical relevance of considering the noncooperative consumption model in addition to the (more common) model that assumes cooperative behavior.
To focus our discussion, we have concentrated on the characterization of consumption models with and without cooperation, and testing consistency of observed behavior with alternative model speci…cations. If observed behavior is consistent with a particular model (i.e. can be rationalized), then a natural next question pertains to recovering/identifying the decision model that underlies the (rationalizable) observed consumption behavior. Such recovery can start from the MIP methodology presented in this paper. In this respect, we can refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010b), who consider these questions for the cooperative model; their analysis is directly extended to the noncooperative model discussed here. Their basic argument is that nonparametric revealed preference recovery on the basis of an MIP characterization of rational behavior boils down to de…ning feasible sets characterized by the MIP constraints.
We see at least two interesting applications of recovery. First, recovery can focus on the individuals' MWTP for the publicly consumed goods. As indicated above, lack of intrahousehold cooperation implies that the sum of these individual MWTP deviates from the observed prices for the publicly consumed goods. The MIP method can be used for quantifying this discrepancy between MWTP and observed prices (as a measure for the e¢ ciency loss caused by noncooperation) in empirical applications. Next, one can try to recover the income distribution that is associated with rationalizable behavior while accounting for noncooperation. As a matter of fact, the literature on cooperative household consumption behavior has paid considerable attention to analyzing the intrahousehold distribution underlying observed cooperative-rationalizable behavior. See, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005), Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) , who focus on various welfare-related questions associated with sharing rule recovery. The methodology presented in this paper allows for analyzing similar questions for the noncooperative model. 17 As for empirical applications, we remark that our methodology can also be used to analyze multi-person group behavior. Indeed, a lot of situations involve groups of individuals spending a joint budget; e.g. decisions of committees, clubs, villages and other local organizations, or …rms with multiple decision makers. Ekeland (2006, 2009) suggest the cooperative (Pareto e¢ cient) model as a natural benchmark for assessing the collective rationality of such group decisions. Our methodology allows for assessing group decisions that do not meet this benchmark. In this respect, an interesting avenue for follow-up research consists of analyzing group consumption behavior on the basis of data gathered by means of a laboratory experiment. In fact, it has been argued that the nonparametric revealed preference methodology is particularly useful in combination with such experimental data. See, for example, Sippel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) for earlier applications that experimentally analyze individually rational behavior. Interestingly, such an experimental set-up easily allows for gathering (individual-speci…c and group-speci…c) information that can help us to better understand the mechanics underlying group consumption behavior (e.g. the within-group income distribution and the within-group (non)cooperation).
Finally, as indicated above, our own application to RLMS data motivates the empirical analysis of models that account for limited intrahousehold cooperation. In fact, this can also suggest a need for 'semicooperative' household consumption models, which allow for 'partial'cooperation between household members. Because these semicooperative models are situated between the fully cooperative model and the fully noncooperative model, they may often provide a more realistic description of household consumption behavior. d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) provided a …rst study of such a semicooperative model. Focusing on the local di¤er-ential characterization of semicooperative behavior, they also derive a corresponding rank condition on the (pseudo) Slutsky matrix. We see the development of a revealed preference approach to analyze semicooperative behavior as an interesting avenue for follow-up research. 
The inequalities are replaced by equalities in case the quantities of the goods under consideration are strictly positive. Next, concavity of the utility functions U A and U B implies for all t; v 2 T :
For all t 2 T , de…ne U 
Using Theorem 1, we know that these two conditions are equivalent to the conditions that fp t ;P 
De…ne the functions U A and U B such that:
Notice that U A and U B are continuous, concave, strictly monotone and that for all 
This provides the wanted result, i.e. fq 
Appendix 2: independence -examples
Throughout, we will use " to represent a strictly positive but su¢ ciently small number.
Example 1: cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable
We …rst construct a data set that is cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable. The data set contains 3 observations (T = ft; v; wg) and 3 public goods (K = f1; 2; 3g). More speci…cally, the set S contains the following information: To show cooperative-rationalizability, we consider the following speci…cation: This speci…cation clearly meets the conditionP
. By computing for both members all inner vector-products,P M s Q u (s; u 2 T; M = A; B); it is straightforward to verify that fP A t ; Q t g t2T and fP B t ; Q t g t2T both satisfy garp. As such the data set meets the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for cooperativerationalizability in Theorem 2.
We still need to prove that the data set S is not noncooperative-rationalizable. Recall that we must have max Any choice of M makes that garp is violated either by the set fP A t ; Q t g t2T (because Q t R A Q w ) or by the set fP B t ; Q t g t2T (because Q v R B Q w ). We conclude that the given data set does not meet the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Example 2: noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperativerationalizable
We next construct a data set that is noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperativerationalizable. This data set contains 4 observations (T = ft; v; w; zg) and 4 public goods (K = f1; 2; 3; 4g): We …rst demonstrate that this data set is noncooperative-rationalizable. To see this, we consider the following speci…cation: K): Again, it is straightforward to verify that the sets fP A t ; Q t g t2T and fP B t ; Q t g t2T both satisfy garp. Therefore, we conclude that the given data set meets the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Next, it can be veri…ed that the given data set does not pass the condition for consistency with the cooperative model that is given in Proposition 2 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007); the reasoning is similar to the one in their Example 1. For brevity, we do not include the argument here, but it can be obtained upon request. We thus conclude that the given data set violates the necessary and su¢ cient condition in Theorem 2. 
